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José Barrientos  
To meet Michael Russell means introducing ourselves into two experiences: the 
deepness of his writings and the practical knowledge of a man dedicated to 
helping other people during nearly fifty years. He opened his philosophical 
consultation in the early seventies.   Therefore, he is a resource for this field, for 
people who want to open their own business in this sphere.   His years behind his 
desk and the ideas behind his articles are an inspiration for all of us. 
 Michael, let me ask you how Philosophical Counseling appeared in your 




Let me give a detailed answer to this question.  Maybe that will encourage other 
philosophical practitioners to find their own way while getting some idea from 
paths taken by others. . 
 As far back as 1965 when I was a teaching assistant for an introductory 
philosophy course I found that students who came to my office hours often 
wanted to talk about their personal problems regarding such matters as 
relationships, anxiety, meaning, love, sexuality, and the like. Perhaps the flavour 
of my lectures on existentialist philosophy and literature signalled my openness 
to that sort of thing.  Usually I would encourage these students to go to the 
university’s counseling center for a deeper kind of interaction than I felt 
competent to address, though not without first attempting some dialogue which 
was meaningful for us both.   
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 By the time I became an assistant professor of philosophy at California 
State University, Fullerton, I had come to suspect that a background in 
philosophy might have more to offer on an applied and personal level than  
would be popularly supposed.  That suspicion was deepened when I chanced 
upon opportunities to participate in some forms of “encounter groups” which 
were in vogue at that time.   It was my good fortune to be able to audit an 
experimental “interdisciplinary” course at my school in which undergraduate 
students served as “group leaders.”  This course mixed weekly readings, weekly 
assigned reaction papers, and an “encounter group” format.  I was still inclined 
to refer students with personal struggles to consult with the university’s 
professional counsellors, but while I was learning from group leading and 
supervision I grew in confidence.  I began to see myself as having some relevant 
basic skills for responding to the interpersonal issues that students presented in 
my office hours.  
  I decided that if I was indeed going to be presented with situations that 
called for counseling abilities—lowly philosopher that I might be—I had best do 
what I could to cultivate what abilities might come within my province.  I 
grabbed every opportunity that served this end, taking experiential workshops, 
auditing counseling courses, and reading counseling books.  I was able to create 
all sorts of formal and informal situations where I would receive supervision for 
doing things of a counseling sort, including volunteering in community agencies.  
I sought out colleagues in the counseling department and the psychology 
department in my university.  Apparently my credentials in philosophy intrigued 
my colleagues and this led to opportunities to collaborate on co-teaching classes. 
In 1972, one of my colleagues offered an especially innovative class that was 
offered off-campus in his mountain home.  This led to my   co-leading this 
experiential week-long residential group.    
 I continued to co-lead these week-long residential events for 19 years. By 
far, the biggest contribution to my becoming able to engage others on a level rich 
in affect-- countering my own fear of feelings in others and in myself-- came 
from participating in these and various forms of experiential groups.  Meanwhile, 
within my own Philosophy Department, it was my good fortune to have 
colleagues who were receptive to my developing interests.  As an academic with 
reasonably respectable credentials I was able to propose atypical courses.  In 
1973 I created and taught a course called “Existential Group.” Unlike a 
traditional course on Existentialism (which I also teach) this one used readings in 
Existentialism as the vehicle for students talking and writing about personal 
issues.  For example, students would read Kafka’s The Trial and then I would 
ask them to talk and write about specific ways in which they, like Kafka’s 
character, might be going through life vaguely feeling “accused” of something, 
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though no one would tell them exactly what it was or how to be acquitted of the 
charges.  Or they might read something by Sartre and then prompted to address 
ways in which they might fit Sartre’s descriptions of how we deceive ourselves. 
Or they might read something by Nietzsche and then look at ways in which their 
own values might be illuminated by his critique of “slave morality.” My growing 
experience in leading groups led me to shift from worrying so much about 
stirring up feeling.  With experience I was getting bolder about that. And where I 
had worried about whether as a philosopher I was trespassing into areas reserved 
for other disciplines, I was, more and more, seeing those fields as doing what I 
regarded as a province of philosophy.   
 At about the same time that Existential Group class came about there were, 
from time to time, individuals who wanted to meet with me privately.  After 
consulting with a lawyer about how to minimize my exposure to legal 
vulnerability I began to offer independently of my university private sessions for 
individuals and groups. My on-going self-styled education in counseling kept me 
appreciative of talents I needed which have been cultivated by other disciplines 
and which did not come as part of my formal training in philosophy.  I certainly 
did have very relevant abilities in terms of being able to follow the complex 
thinking of another person, spot underlying assumptions (often rooted in familiar 
philosophical positions), and think of ways to defend the other person’s 
perspective.  I could be quick to think of counter-examples and counter-
arguments to assertions about most anything.  Where I was not so well grounded 
by philosophical training was more in the area of being ready to have and hear 
emotion.  
 At the same time, I was increasingly convinced that much of what is done in 
those other fields, which I formerly thought deserved a monopoly on serious and 
intensive self-inquiry, was about matters centrally philosophical in nature, and 
matters about which philosophy had a much longer standing claim—at least as 
far back as Socrates. If philosophers had a tendency to be somewhat out of touch 
with affect, this didn’t have to be the case.  
  I was further encouraged by discovering in California laws about 
psychotherapy, that there was a clause saying, in effect, that these laws were not 
intended to preclude members in other professions from doing things within their 
purview.  (I suspect that   many of the state laws in America will have similar 
caveats.) While this was heartening, there would certainly be plenty of 
professional groups who would oppose my sort of applied philosophy.  I thought 
it prudent to not be very conspicuous in offering a philosophical practice.  Yet it 
seemed obvious to me that there were then, and before me, other philosophers 
who also would have been drawn into forms of discourse more personal, applied, 
different from the more usual format of lecturing to a class. Some philosophy 
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 2, 2011, pp. 155-166 
J. MICHAEL RUSSELL 
 
158 
books in circulation at the time were plainly written for a far more individualized 
application than would be the case in the usual classroom. And there were well-
known forms of psychotherapy current before then which were plainly and 
deeply built on existential philosophy (followers of Heidegger, like Boss and 
Binswanger, thinkers deeply indebted to Sartre, like R.D. Laing), mergers 
between counseling and Eastern philosophy, forms of intervention based on 
critical thinking, such as Rational-Emotive Therapy. I could hardly be the first to 
be taking the direction I did! 
  Mercifully, there is no such thing as a “license” for philosophers who 
wanted to do counseling.  However, I wanted some assurance that I was not a 
simple charlatan.  I found that I could take a rigorous examination used by some 
states in the United States for certifying counselors. Preparing for this exam and 
passing it was one of several self-imposed means of establishing that I was not 
utterly over my head in my practice.  That was in 1983. At about the same time I 
found myself re-thinking what had been a pretty critical view of classical 
psychoanalysis. I started to become familiar with major developments in that 
realm.  My exposure to the sometimes philosophically simplistic failings of pop-
culture forms of therapy, and the philosophical shortcomings of academic and 
behaviorist psychology left me feeling that my expanded view of philosophy was 
a legitimate alternative. For different reasons I became positively impressed with 
psychoanalysis.  There I saw very impressive intellectual sophistication.  There 
was a lot I wanted to learn there.  And I was (and am) convinced that 
psychoanalysis could profit greatly from increased input from philosophers. 
From 1983 to 1988 I trained and was certified in psychoanalysis and have 
offered a psychoanalytic practice since then.  Let me emphasize here that this 
training surely did provide me with very extensive skills and training substantive 
and different than what came with my education in philosophy but, for all that, I 
have continued to believe that the core of what I offer to my clientele is 
fundamentally philosophical in character.  
 
José Barrientos  
There are different definitions and conceptions on Philosophical Counseling and 
Practice. Some authors have argued that education or “bildung” is basic in its 
development, others have defended that Critical Thinking is the basic tool and 
others have looked for rationality beyond analytic knowledge as a poetical 
reason.  What is your definition on Philosophical Practice?  
 
 Michael Russell 
The problem with this question is in the implication that there is some basic and 
essential defining feature of philosophical counseling and practice. Roughly, 
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philosophical counseling is any sort of counseling that conspicuously draws from 
philosophy.  A philosophical counselor is someone emphasizing a background in 
philosophy.  A philosophical practitioner is something done by a philosopher by 
way of an attempt to put his or her ideas and training to some real-life practical 
problem.  So philosophical counseling is a species of philosophical practice.  But 
I don’t mean any of this to stand as definitions.  I only want to give some 
indication of how we might make senses of these terms.   I don’t think there is 
any or only one thing that counts for “counseling” any more than there is just one 
way of being a philosopher or doing philosophy.  There’s not any one thing or 
only thing that counts for “counseling” any more than there is just one way of 
being a philosopher or doing philosophy. There is no single formula or any 
single methodological emphasis that is going to precisely capture the essence of 
either term or their combination.  Inevitably, there will be diverse activities 
falling under either term whether taken alone or in combination.  There will be 
overlapping and similar features between purportedly different activities. We 
can, of course, say some relevant things about what counts for philosophy, and 
we can do this for counseling.  But philosophical counseling just isn’t a distinct 
discipline.   
 Words like “philosophical” and “counselor” are in the public domain of 
everyday language, and they remain so when philosophers who counsel use 
everyday language to describe what they do.  So, nobody started philosophical 
counseling. Nobody has a “copyright” on these words.      There are, of course, 
individuals and approaches that have gained prominence and advanced the idea 
that philosophy might be useful, and, thanks to these, there is a growing 
appreciation of possibilities for philosophical practice and philosophical 
counseling. But, to say it again, no one owns these terms. 
  Different philosophers will bring different interests and talents to the 
practical arena.  My own vision of philosophy, certainly shared by the 
professional philosophers I know and respect, includes a high level of 
commitment to critical thinking and reasoned argument.  Whatever else 
philosophical counselors incorporated into their services I would certainly hope 
critical thinking would play a big part.   Having said that, one could imagine 
philosophical practitioners who drew from thinkers who challenged what they 
regarded as a misplaced emphasis on “being rational.”  I’m not sure I yet 
understand what “bildung” means but, again, if the idea is to capture or impose 
something that any and all philosophical counselors are supposedly about, this is, 
in my opinion, a mistake.    
 
José Barrientos  
How did you create this sort of definition?  
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To be honest, my attempts to articulate the nature of philosophical counseling 
and to argue that it is not a distinct discipline were set in a personal context of 
frustration and annoyance on several levels.  I found myself developing a 
“practice,” a professional service that I wanted to be able to describe in a truthful 
and meaningful way. However, I did not want to unnecessarily attract attention 
in a manner that would create anxiety for me about either legal vulnerability or 
ethical concerns over what sort of competency to profess.   
 An added complication was in wanting to use terms that did not seem to 
already belong exclusively to other fields.  I was worried about this well before 
the 1980s when I began to hear of philosophical practice in Europe. Some spoke 
of this as if referring to very specific practitioners and their restricted vision of 
practice.  I did and do find it disturbing that a rather large number of the words 
with which one would naturally try to describe efforts at making applied use of 
philosophy might be treated as if these words could have something like a 
copyright.  This would be like someone making a brand name out of an everyday 
term, like “book” and then declaring that you couldn’t say you were “writing a 
book.”  Some words just naturally fit for the task of describing what a 
philosopher might be trying to do here, the words  “philosophy” and 
“philosophical,” obviously, and to some extent words like “counseling’” and 
“consulting.”  I also wanted words that would have some marketability or 
attraction or, at least, communicate something that might catch the attention of 
someone who might like the service.  “Individualized Ontological Inquiry” 
would not attract many clients.  The word “therapy” would have good marketing 
potential but for various reasons I did not much like that term.  “Personal 
consultant” and “existential consultant” work decently well.  “Philosophical 
counseling” also falls naturally in to serviceability here.  I proceeded to describe 
myself in these sorts of ways, convinced that no one had a monopoly on these 
words. 
 
José Barrientos  
Has it changed in these forty years as Philosophical Counselor?  
 
Michael Russell 
Well, I’ve changed.  Early on I was advocating the practical virtues of studying 
philosophy and a more bold vision of what philosophers might do, but I was 
careful to not to call attention to my own practice with words that might ask for 
trouble.  Now I am more ready to be an open advocate of working in areas where 
other professions may think they should have a monopoly.  I still do not much 
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like the word ‘therapy’.  Now that I am sure I can use the word legally, I am 
more willing to describe myself as a therapist and as doing therapy. This is a 
pragmatic matter of how to market services effectively. What I still don’t like is 
the implication that I am going to do something to which my client is the passive 
recipient, and that if I do it right they will be fixed or cured.   
 
José Barrientos 
You have worked as Psychoanalyst and Philosophical Counselor. However, 
some counsellors have negated mental illness, others have talked about a kind of 
competition between our profession and psychologist and/psychoanalyst. What 
do you think about it? 
 
Michael Russell 
Psychoanalysis in the United States has historically been regarded as a branch of 
medicine.  I think that perception is in transition partly because psychologists 
here have won the right to train in and practice psychoanalysis.  Academic 
psychologists have regarded their work as empirical science, and many clinical 
psychologists work from the evolution of psychoanalytic concepts.  Both groups 
see themselves as having distinctive methodologies, and most see themselves in 
a context of treatment and cure.  Not surprisingly, there will be members of both 
groups who will be unfriendly to philosophers  presumed untrained in all these 
aspects, just as there will be members of both groups who are open to the idea of 
philosophical practitioners. As a practical matter fears of “competition” are 
probably not terribly significant. The numbers of philosophical practitioners is 
likely to remain quite small in comparison to traditional ways of preparing for 
providing “therapy.”   
There certainly are problems with the language of mental illness, but it would be 
colossally naive to think this sort of language has no legitimate application to 
people who might seek out philosophical counseling.  And, it would be badly 
mistaken to suppose that philosophical practitioners will (or should) only deal 
with “healthy” individuals. What counts for “mental health” is on a continuum.  
The helpfulness or unhelpfulness of diagnostic language is a pragmatic matter.  
Counselors ought to be reluctant to work with individuals who are well beyond 
their level of comfort, experience, and expertise, nor should they ever suppose 
they are working with someone to whom mental health vocabulary has no 
possible application.   
 
José Barrientos  
Briefly, could you review one of the counselees you received in 2010 in your 
consultation? 
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I’m not comfortable writing about any of my recent counselees.  I can tell you 
about a fictitious client I wrote about in Gerald Corey’s Case Approach to 
Counseling and Psychotherapy (Thomson: Brooks/Cole, 2009).  “Ruth” sought 
me out after taking a college course on theories of counseling.  I had asked her 
instructor to include me on a list of referrals.  Ruth was interested, generally, in 
an existential approach to better understanding herself, and she also wanted to 
address some specific issues.  Her children were grown and in the process of 
moving out.  Ruth had returned to college out of an interest in becoming a school 
counselor.  She was anxious about this because she was in the habit of thinking 
of herself as “just a mom.”  Her husband thought himself supportive of her 
professional aspirations but gave her somewhat “mixed messages” in that he 
clearly liked being catered to in keeping with stereotype notions of what women 
ought to do by way of taking care of the household.  Her relationship with her 
parents was somewhat strained owing to her having departed from her father’s 
rather fundamentalist religious views.   He was certain to disapprove of her 
career aspirations.   
 We met for about a year and addressed these and other issues.  Initially 
Ruth seemed to expect that I would lecture her on how she was “responsible” 
and “had a choice” about this or that.  She seemed to think that a self-proclaimed 
Existentialist” would preach about freedom.   I think such lofty speeches are 
pointless.  Over time I did challenge her to consider how her way of labelling  
herself with the identity of “just a mom” served to protect her from the anxiety of 
taking her life in new directions, challenging her husband’s expectations, and 
risking parental disapproval.  I did not mention that I got this line of thinking 
from reading Sartre.  I also believe that I was right to refrain from providing 
encouragement about her talents and prospects.  In the absence of either 
conspicuous approval or disapproval from me I think Ruth learned to better 
approve of herself. 
 
José Barrientos  
How do you distinguish between a person who needs Philosophical Counseling 
sessions and others who need therapy? Could you explain a case from your 
practice to explain the difference? 
 
Michael Russell  
It will come as no surprise that I do not have a “neat” answer for this question 
since I do not think that doing philosophical counseling and doing therapy are 
neatly distinct activities.  One very rough indicator might be that philosophical 
counseling tends to emphasize thinking and therapy tends to emphasize affect, 
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but there are plenty of psychotherapists who see themselves as focusing on a 
client’s belief system, and there surely will be some philosophical counselors 
who, like me, are more interested in eliciting affect.  In my work with Ruth I see 
myself as doing both.  Another rough indicator might lie in one’s assessment of 
the overall severity of a client’s complaints and a global assessment of that 
client’s level of functioning.  Ruth strikes me as high functioning, though her 
struggles certainly address powerful issues.  Yet another indicator—an extremely 
important one, I think—is whether or not the counselor is explicitly offering and 
the client is explicitly seeking to have a condition diagnosed and treated.  Having 
promoted my services as a psychotherapist, I am inclined to describe my services 
to Ruth as psychotherapy.  I would not be so inclined had I simply promoted my 
services under the heading of “philosophical counseling.” 
 
José Barrientos  
Another interesting topic on Philosophical Practice is on training. You have 
provided three day training and certification workshops with Professor Lou 
Marinoff, in Europe and in the United States. What do you think are the main 
topics that a counselor has to learn to become a good professional?   
 
Michael Russell 
I hope readers will look at the American Philosophical Practitioners Association 
website – www.appa.edu/--for the official account of the nature and intent of the 
basic certification workshops that Lou and I offer. These training events have 
been mainly for people already well educated in philosophy who are in early 
stages of exploring prospects for philosophical practice. There are also 
professionals from other fields who are intrigued with the idea of including more 
of an explicitly philosophical sort in what they provide.  Obviously, there are 
limits to what we can do in three days.  Speaking just for myself here, I think we 
are “certifying” that these individuals have reasonably solid philosophical 
credentials and apparently laudable motivation.  We provide an overview of the 
history and scope of philosophical practice. We offer both encouragement and 
some cautions about making philosophical practice a facet of ones career.  We 
address ethical concerns.  We provide some basic considerations regarding the 
selection of clients.  We provide ideas about when and how to seek out 
consultation.  We review various techniques for utilizing philosophy within a 
counseling setting, and discuss different options regarding whether or not to 
emphasize affect in ones way of working. We provide demonstrations and 
opportunities for each participant to conduct “sessions.”  We present basic ideas 
on how to network and market ones practice.  In short, we provide an 
endorsement of the participants as being off to a good start and having a good 
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mix of boldness and modesty as they seek to create their own ways of being of 
service.  
 These are among the appropriate areas to be addressed early.  APPA also 
offers advanced levels of certification. To date, I have not been involved in these.  
I do want to preserve my liberal portrait of philosophical counseling as 
something that can take on quite diverse forms.  So while one person might 
develop abilities in Socratic dialogue, another might try to develop applied 
critical thinking, another in working out implications of some particular 
philosopher or school of philosophy.  I am ready to be convinced of advanced 
areas that should be addressed by all.     
 
José Barrientos  




My role in certification is with persons already trained in philosophy at a masters 
or doctorate level.  Here the question is how to supplement what they already 
know.  But let me be absolutely clear that I do not believe training in philosophy 
begins to be sufficient for providing some of the sorts of interventions that a 
layman would call “psychotherapy,” at the level of emotionality that 
psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, psychoanalysts have tried to prepare 
themselves to do.  What I do think is that philosophy provides a much better 
foundation for doing that sort of thing than might be widely supposed, and that 
neither medicine nor the science of psychology are plainly preferable in the 
intellectual styles they foster.  A very different matter is what sort of additional 
training needs to be built on that foundation.  Minimally this should include very 
extensive emotionally focused self-exploration by the aspiring practitioner and 
very extensive experience with clients supplemented by supervision or 
consultation with experienced helping professionals.   
 
José Barrientos  
In addition to your curriculum as philosophical counsellor you have taught 
courses in the Department of Philosophy and the Department of Human Services 
at California State University, Fullerton. What do you think is the relationship 
between the academic and Philosophical Practice? What should be this 
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Michael Russell 
I know there are many advocates of philosophical practice who are very critical 
of academic philosophy.  Not me.  My own experience in academia has been 
very positive both in what I got from my undergraduate and graduate education 
and in what I have been free to do as a member of the academy.  I studied the 
familiar cannons of Western philosophy, analytic and continental philosophy, 
some Eastern thinking, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, logic—all the things 
that were “mainstream” in the ‘60s and ‘70s.  My vision of Philosophical 
Practice draws from my positive regard for most of this.  I do think quite a large 
part of this can help one prepare for offering helpful interactions to people with 
every-day practical issues.  And, to be honest, I tend to not have much of a high 
opinion of the philosophical credentials of those who either lack exposure to the 
traditional areas or lack respect for them. 
  
José Barrientos  
Sometimes, I have said that Philosophical Practice should be understood as a 
branch of Philosophy like Philosophy of Technology, Logic, or Aesthetics.  All of 
them have a common philosophical core and a peculiar development. Therefore, 
when we are working with counselees, mainly, we are doing philosophy in a 
specific way. What do you think of this point? Is it possible to see in the future 
the creation of a chair or lectureship of Philosophical Practice or Philosophical 
Counseling in University? 
 
Michael Russell 
Well as I’ve said, I value the tradition of philosophy in which I was educated:  
history, analytic, continental, etc.  I wish everyone were exposed to much of 
what I studied.  At the same time, I respect diversity.  I would want to be 
cautious about the extent to which I would either assume or insist that others 
share my background.  I would hope that a university chair would share my mix 
of a conservative vision of the nature of philosophy and a liberal and creative 
vision of what might be done with this. 
 
José Barrientos  
Let’s finish talking about the future. What do you see ahead for Philosophical 
Practice and what are your quests for oncoming years? 
 
Michael Russell 
I hope and predict that philosophical practice will continue to grow and will do 
so in diverse ways.  The point should be promoting the value of philosophy, and 
hopefully we will get past in fighting among philosophers and cross-disciplinary 
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squabbling over territory.  Hopefully we will advance our capacity to learn from 
one-another.  I hope to continue to play a role in fostering both boldness and 
modesty in philosophers pursuing this path.  And I expect to continue   to think 
about matters which are both philosophical and practical in character.  
 
José Barrientos  
Thank you, Michael. It is always is a pleasure to talk to you and to Valerie.  I 
hope to see you as soon as possible… Maybe in Korea. 
 
